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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

KIMBERLY SHEA HAVATONE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070135-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Ann
Boyden presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted Officer Malley's two
brief references to defendant's forgery, where that testimony was relevant to show the
general circumstances surrounding defendant's possession of drugs and Officer Malley's
discovery of them?
Standard of review. Appellate courts review a trial court's decision to admit rule
404(b) evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11,115,
108 P.3d 730 (citing State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, \ 16, 6 P.3d 1120).

2. Did the trial court plainly err by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine
defendant with questions that elicited defendant's testimony that forgery is a crime
involving dishonesty?
3. Did the trial court plainly err by not sua sponte striking closing argument
statements that reviewed the evidence from the prosecution's standpoint and discussed
the inferences and deductions it could reasonably support? Did the trial court plainly err
by not sua sponte striking the prosecutor's single isolated reference to "passing bad
checks"?
Standard of Review. To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an
error occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that
the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, % 41, 82 P.3d 1106.
4. If defendant has demonstrated error, was its cumulative effect sufficient to
undermine confidence that defendant's trial was fair?
Standard of review. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court]
will reverse only if 'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its]
confidence .. . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ^ 74, 125 P.3d
878 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant rules are set forth in the attached Addendum:
Utah R.Evid. 402;
Utah R.Evid. 403;
Utah R.Evid. 404;
Utah R. Evid. 609.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony. Rl-2. A jury found her guilty as charged.
R51, 89. The trial court placed her on probation for 36 months and ordered that she
spend 60 days in jail. R102. Defendant timely appealed. R107.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The crime
On January 27, 2006, a snowy morning, Officer David Malley "was
working . . . the dope motel." Rl 19:128. He was visiting low budget motels, "checking
the parking lots, stolen cars, looking for fugitives and anything that might evolve from
that." Id. While checking the parking lot of a Motel 6 near the intersection of North
Temple and Redwood Road, Officer Malley came upon a vehicle registered to defendant
Kimberly Havatone, who was wanted on a felony warrant. Rl 19:128-29.
Before he could investigate that matter, Officer Malley saw another suspicious
circumstance—a vehicle with a license plate not on file. Rl 19:129. Because that vehicle
was leaving the lot, Officer Malley followed it, made a stop, and arrested the driver. Id.
Before he put the driver into the rear seat of his police vehicle to take him to jail, Officer
Malley "lifted the rear seat, looked, [and] saw nothing." Id. After Officer Malley arrived
at the jail, he "removed [the driver] from the [police] vehicle" and "again lifted the seat
and looked and made sure there was nothing there." Id.
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This procedure was part of the process Officer Malley undertook "[e]very time" he
arrested and transported an individual. Rl 19:130. He did this because "[i]n the event
that there's contraband left in the car, you want to know where it came from." Id.1
After he had booked the driver at the jail, Officer Malley pulled up the warrant on
defendant. Rl 19:130-31. During a break in the weather, Officer Malley again checked
under the rear seat of his police vehicle, again found nothing, and then returned to the
Motel 6. Rl 19:131. When he arrived at the Motel 6, he went to the front office to ask
"what room [defendant's] vehicle was registered to." Id. He then went to that room,
knocked on the door, and located defendant. Rl 19:131-32. He told her that he was there
to arrest her on a forgery warrant. Rl 19:132.
Defendant was compliant. Rl 19:133. Officer Malley searched defendant for
weapons, placed her in the police vehicle, and transported her to the jail. Rl 19:134.
When they arrived at the jail, Officer Malley had her step out of the car "[a]nd then lifted
up the seat cushion" to "look and see if there[] [was] any contraband there." Rl 19:135.
When he lifted the seat, he found a plastic twist containing was appeared to be
methamphetamine lying on the floorboard. Rl 19:136.

1

Officer Malley was the only driver of his patrol car. Rl 19:107. He made
custodial arrests and transported arrestees in his vehicle about five times a week.
Rl 19:105. As explained, he lifted the rear seat both before and after placing someone in
his vehicle, and he did it every time he transported someone. Rl 19:129-30. About eight
to ten times a year, he found that contraband had been concealed under the seat during
the ride. Rl 19:130.
4

The twist of methamphetamine was a little larger than a pea or a kernel of corn.
Rl 19:139. Officer Malley was not surprised that he had not found the twist during the
weapons search because it was "so small and easily concealed." Id. He showed the twist
to defendant and told her that he had found it. Rl 19:142. She denied that it was hers. Id.
She said, "I did a forgery but I don't do drugs, you can test me." Id.
Officer Malley booked defendant into jail and took the plastic twist back to the
police department, where he conducted a field test on the contents. Rl 19:142-43. They
field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Rl 19:143. He then placed the plastic twist
and its contents into evidence. Id. The crime lab later weighed and analyzed the
substance and found it to be 300 milligrams of methamphetamine. Id.
Ruling on admissibility of evidence regarding forgery
Prior to jury voir dire, the prosecutor and defense counsel discussed with the trial
court the admissibility of certain evidence. Defense counsel opposed admission of
testimony that defendant had been arrested on a forgery warrant at the time Officer
Malley found the methamphetamine. Rl 19:6-7. Defense counsel also opposed
admission of the conversation at the time of the arrest, recorded in the police report, in
which Officer Malley told defendant that "based on his training, forgery and drugs go
hand in hand" and defendant responded, "I did the forgery but I deny the drugs are mine."
R119:5.
The trial court ruled that defendant's statement was admissible to show "the
context of how the arrest occurred and how the conversation occurred." Rl 19:11.
Testimony that she was arrested on a "forgery arrest warrant" was also admissible "to
5

give context to the defendant's statement." Rl 19:13. Testimony about the officer's
statement to defendant "that drugs and forgery go together/' however, was inadmissible
because it was "too prejudicial and it [wa]s simply not something that ha[d] been
supported by expert notice." Rl 19:12.
Defendant asked whether the court would consider a jury instruction clarifying
that defendant was charged only with drug possession and not with forgery. Rl 19:17.
The court said that it would. Id.
References to the forgery at trial
During trial, the parties and their witnesses referred to the forgery at several
points. Officer Malley testified that when he returned to the Motel 6 and found
defendant, he explained that he was there to arrest her on a forgery warrant. Rl 19:132.
He also testified that when he found and confronted defendant with the twist of
methamphetamine she said, "I did a forgery, but I don't do drugs, you can test me."
R119:142.
Defendant, who took the stand in her own defense, testified, "I pled guilty to a
forgery that I committed and I took the responsibility of that." Rl 19:194. Defendant
clarified that she "told Officer Malley that [she] did commit the forgery and that [she]
didn't have anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." Id. She testified that
she "volunteered . . . to take a drug test," but that Officer Malley did not perform one.
R119:194-95.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether forgery is a crime
committed "with the purpose to defraud anyone," committed by making a "writing so that
6

the writing . .. purports to be the act of another.59 Rl 19:197. Defense counsel objected,
but the court allowed defendant to answer. Rl 19:198. Defendant answered, "Yes." The
prosecutor then asked, "So this is a situation that involves someone's honesty, doesn't
it?" Defendant again answered, "Yes." Id.
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defendant constructively
possessed the methamphetamine. Rl 19:215. He stated, "She thinks all Officer Malley
has on her at that time is the forgery warrant," she's "going to jail for the forgery
warrant," she's "got meth on [her]," and she does not "want to get caught with it." Id.
She therefore intentionally and knowingly "conceal[s] it underneath the seat cushion."
R119.-216.
Defense counsel argued that this is "not a typical case because nothing was ever
found on [defendant]." Rl 19:226. Pointing out the prosecutor's references to the
forgery, counsel reminded the jury that "[t]his is not a case about forgery," but about
"whether or not [defendant] was in possession of the methamphetamine." Rl 19:238. He
emphasized that defendant "pled guilty on the forgery," admitted the forgery "from the
get-go," but "[f]rom the get-go . . . ha[d] asserted" that she "did not. .. have possession
of the drugs." Id.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor observed that "the defense in his closing argument
made a pretty big deal about the fact that the defendant had been convicted of forgery,
wanted to bring that to your attention and make sure that you're clear on the fact that
there's no forgery charge today." Rl 19:241. The prosecutor observed that defense
counsel emphasized these matters because "he want[ed] to divert [the jury's] attention
7

away from the fact that the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for
forgery, passing bad checks." Rl 19:242. The prosecutor argued that the forgery
conviction did not make defendant a bad person, but did undermine her credibility. Id.
He continued, "The defense would lead you to believe that because she admitted to the
forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also true." Id. But, he continued,
"That to me is very strange . . . because she admits to lying about something, having lied
in the past and then wants you to believe that she[] [was] not lying on that day. Don't be
fooled by this. Don't be fooled." Id
Defendant did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements during closing
argument. See Rl 19:212-221, 240-246.
Responses to court offers to include clarifying instructions
As explained, after the court issued its ruling on allowing limited testimony
regarding defendant's forgery, defendant asked whether the court would consider a jury
instruction clarifying that defendant was charged only with drug possession and not with
forgery. Rl 19:17. The court said that it would. Id. Defendant did not submit an
instruction. Rl 19:95.
After opening statements, but before presentation of testimony, the court asked
defense counsel whether he wished to submit an instruction. Rl 19:95. Defendant did not
choose to submit an instruction at that time. Rl 19:95-97. After both parties had rested,
the court again asked whether either party wished to propose jury instructions "given
what came out on the testimony on the forgery." Rl 19:203. Neither party did. Id.

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The trial court properly exercised its discretion when it ruled that Officer
Malley could testify that defendant had been arrested on a forgery warrant and was being
transported to the police station when the drugs were placed under the rear seat of the
police vehicle. The trial court also properly exercised its discretion to permit the officer
to testify to defendant's response when confronted with the drugs. The evidence was
relevant to show the circumstances surrounding the crime and permitted the officer to
paint a factual picture of the context in which the events transpired, thereby showing the
connection between defendant and the drugs.
2. The trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte striking the prosecutor's
cross-examination of defendant about the nature of her forgery conviction. The
prosecutor did not elicit the details of the forgery crime, but merely elicited defendant's
testimony that forgery is a crime involving dishonesty, a matter relevant to credibility.
Moreover, defendant opened the door to the cross-cross examination by trying to show
that she was forthright and believable because she took responsibility for the forgery.
3. The trial court did not plainly err by not sua sponte striking portions of the
prosecutor's closing argument. The prosecutor acted properly in urging the jury not to
find defendant forthright and credible based on her claim that she had "t[aken]
responsibility" for the forgery, where forgery is, in fact, a crime involving dishonesty.
He did not disparage defense counsel nor improperly assert personal knowledge or his
own opinion. Rather, he argued an inference supported by the evidence. In addition,
while the prosecutor's reference to "passing bad checks" was improper, it was a single
9

isolated sentence in another otherwise well-tried case and does not justify a reversal.
Absent the remark, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have received
a more favorable result.
4. Any errors in this case, even considered cumulatively, were so minor that they
do not undermine confidence that defendant received a fair trial.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT PERMITTED OFFICER MALLEY TO TESTIFY TO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS DISCOVERY THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED DRUGS
Officer Malley testified that he arrested defendant on an outstanding forgery
warrant, placed her in his police vehicle, transported her to the police station, and then
found drugs concealed under the seat where she had been sitting. Rl 19:132-42. He also
testified that when he showed her the methamphetamine twist, she said, "I did a forgery,
but I don't do drugs, you can test me." Rl 19:142.
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Officer
Malley "to repeat [her] declaration that she committed forgery." Appellant's Br. at 16.
She claims that the officer's testimony was "bad act testimony," admitted to "prove the
character of a person in order to show action conformity therewith," in violation of Utah
evidence rule 404(b). Id. at 18. She claims that the officer's testimony that he arrested
her on a forgery warrant "was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial." Id. at 26. Defendant
cannot prevail on this claim.
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The Utah Supreme Court has established a three-step process for analyzing claims
under rule 404(b). First, the trial court must "determine whether the bad acts evidence is
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT
59, Tf 18, 6 P.3d 1120. Second, the "court must determine whether the bad acts evidence
meets the requirement of rule 402, which permits admission of only relevant evidence."
Id. at \19. Third, the court must "determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the
requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. at f 20. "Improperly
admitted evidence requires reversal of a conviction only where [the court] conclude[s]
there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings."
State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, f 27, 4 P.3d 100 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
As set forth below, the evidence of defendant's forgery charge was offered for
proper, noncharacter purposes; it was relevant to those purposes; and its probative value
was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice. Moreover, no
reasonable likelihood exists that error, if any, affected the outcome of the proceedings.
A.

Testimony regarding defendant's forgery charge was offered for proper,
noncharacter purposes and was relevant to the issues raised by this case.
Defendant's principal contention is that the testimony regarding her forgery charge

was offered for an improper purpose under rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) states that while
"[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith," such evidence is admissible for
"other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
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knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident." This list of acceptable
noncharacter purposes is "not exhaustive . . . and evidence demonstrating other purposes
is not precluded so long as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to
show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged." State v. Allen, 2005 UT
11, If 17, 108 P.3d 730. Thus, Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule with regard to other
crimes evidence which is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 24, 993 P.2d 837.
Here, the trial court properly ruled that testimony regarding defendant's forgery
charge was not offered for an improper purpose, but rather for the legitimate
noncharacter purpose of providing factual context for the State's case. Rl 19:11-13.
This Court has held that the,"prosecutor is entitled to paint a factual picture of the
context in which the events in question transpired" and can present evidence of prior bad
acts "as background information" if needed to explain "how the charges against [the
defendant] came forward." State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah App. 1991).
Thus, a defendant's prior bad acts can be discussed "to show the general circumstances
surrounding" the crime at issue. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986)
(allowing presentation of evidence showing that defendant paid for stolen property with
marijuana, stating it "was relevant to show the general circumstances surrounding [his]
purchase, receipt, and retention of the stolen property") (citations omitted). If evidence
of other crimes "has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant
crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the
defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d
12

880, 882 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted); see also State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 24, 25
P.3d 985 (allowing presentation of prior bad acts as "background" for the State's case-inchief); State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, \ 21, 72 P.2d 127 (allowing presentation
of prior criminal history when presented as "context for admissible evidence").
At trial, the State had the burden to prove defendant's constructive possession of
the drugs. To establish constructive possession, the State had to establish "evidence of a
sufficient nexus between defendant and the drugs." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 16,
985 P.2d 911. The State had to "prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were
subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the defendant had the intent to
exercise that control." Id.
Officer Malley's discovery of defendant's vehicle at the motel, his discovery that
defendant was wanted on an outstanding forgery warrant, and his execution of that
warrant were relevant to explain why defendant was in the police vehicle just before the
drugs were found and therefore to show the "nexus" between defendant and the drugs,
her "dominion [over] and control" of the drugs, and her "intent to exercise that control."
Id. Moreover, this information and defendant's response when confronted with the drugs
were "background information" needed to explain "how the charges against [her] came
forward." Morgan, 813 P.2d at 1210 n.4. Finally, admission of this evidence allowed the
prosecutor "to paint a factual picture of the context in which the events in question
transpired." Morgan, 813, P.2d at 1210 n.4. Thus, testimony regarding these matters
was admissible for a proper noncharacter purpose relevant to the issues at trial.

13

B.

The probative value of the testimony about defendant's forgery was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury . . . . " Utah R. Evid. 403. In determining whether other crimes
evidence meets rule 403 's requirements, "a variety of matters must be considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime [and] the
similarities between the crimes," as well as "the interval of time that has elapsed between
the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to over mastering hostility." NelsonWaggoner, 2000 UT 5 9 , \ 2 0 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As explained, the testimony was needed to give context to the crime. Utah courts
have noted, in other factual scenarios, that testimony that allows a witness to describe
"the fall scope of the context" of a crime is highly probative. See State v. Reed, 2000 UT
68, \ 31, 8 P.3d 1025 (addressing testimony that allows a victim to describe the fall scope
of abuse over a period of time). Here, likewise, the testimony allowed Officer Malley,
the State's only witness, to fully describe the incident that gave rise to the charges.
The evidence of defendant's forgery did not present a danger of unfair prejudice.
Defendant's presence in the police vehicle by itself suggested an arrest and a charge.
Evidence that the underlying offense was a forgery was not prejudicial and may, in fact,
have helped defendant. Absent any indication of the crime for which she was being
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transported, the jury may well have inferred that she had been arrested on an outstanding
warrant for another drug offense.
In any case, forgery is not the kind of crime that, under the circumstances of this
case or under the circumstances of most cases, would likely "rouse the jury to over
mastering hostility." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, \ 20. It is not, like a crime of
violence or a sexual crime or a crime against a child, the kind of crime that a juror might
likely find repulsive or inflammatory.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it determined that the probative
value of the challenged evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. SeeKl 19:11-13.
C.

Error, if any, was harmless.
Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the evidence, any error

was harmless. As explained, "Improperly admitted evidence requires reversal of a
conviction only where [the court] conclude[s] there is a reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, ^f 27
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the only real question for the jury was whether defendant slipped the drugs
under the seat of the police car, or whether someone had left the drugs there before she
entered the vehicle. Absent any testimony regarding defendant's forgery, the jury would
still have known that defendant had been arrested for some crime at the time of the
offense. There is no reasonable probability that, had they not known the crime was a
forgery, the outcome would have been more favorable for defendant.
15

Moreover, defense counsel also apparently felt that error, if any, was harmless.
Asked repeatedly whether, given the ruling and testimony on forgery, he wished to offer
a clarifying or limiting instruction, counsel declined. Rl 19:95-97, 203. "An admonition
to the jury usually cures a prejudicial statement, unless it is so patently inflammatory that
justice cannot be served by continuing the trial." Hudson v. State, 146 S.W.3d 380, 388
(Ark. App. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, defendant declined the court's offer of a
cautionary instruction. He is therefore precluded from arguing plain error based on any
error the instruction would have cured. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284-85
(Utah 1989) (stating that "'invited error' . .. 'is procedurally unjustified and viewed with
disfavor, especially where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result'")
(quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)); see also United States v.
Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1019 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that district court's failure to
provide a limiting instruction is not a basis for finding that 404(b) evidence is unfairly
prejudicial where the defendant declined the court's offer to give such an instruction);
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271-73 (Utah 1998) (describing curative instructions as
"a settled and necessary feature of our judicial process," stating that "[i]f a trial judge
could not correct errors as they occur, few trials would be successfully concluded," and
noting that courts "normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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II.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF
DEFENDANT
ABOUT
HER
FORGERY CONVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE RULE 609, AND
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY NOT SUA
SPONTE STRIKING IT
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in allowing the State to cross
examine the defendant as to the details of her forgery conviction," arguing that "[t]he
prosecutor in this case violated rule 609 by seeking more than the nature, date and
sentence for forgery during the defendant's cross-examination." Appellant's Br. at 30, 35
(boldface and capitalization omitted). Defendant asserts that this claim was preserved.
Id. 3. In the alternative, defendant asserts plain error. Id.
A.

Defendant has not preserved this claim nor adequately briefed any exception
to the preservation rule.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on

appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11, 10 P.3d 346. The preservation rule is
"designed to (1) ensure that the trial court has 'an opportunity to address the claimed
error, and if appropriate, correct it,' and (2) inhibit a defendant from ' forego[ing]... an
objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if
that strategy fails, .. . claiming on appeal that the [c]ourt should reverse.'" State v. King,
2006 UT 3, lj 13, 131 P.3d 202 (citations omitted). In other words, "under our
preservation rule, 'defendants are . . . not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at
trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.'" Id. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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A party cannot circumvent the preservation rule by "mere[ly] mention [ing] . . . an
issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority"; such a "mere
mention" "does not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361
(Utah App. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To ensure the trial
court an opportunity to address a claimed error, an objection "must at least be raised to a
level of consciousness such that the trial [court] can consider it." Id. (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
"To serve these policies, [Utah appellate courts have] held that the preservation
rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate,
2000 UT 74, ^ 11. A failure to "articulate an appropriate justification for appellate
review" by arguing either "'plain error'" or '"exceptional circumstance'" precludes
appellate review. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v.
Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^ 45, 114 P.3d 551). See also State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229
n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved claim where appellant did not argue
plain error or exceptional circumstances).
Moreover, a party must adequately brief her claims, including her plain error or
exceptional circumstances claims. "Utah courts routinely decline to considered
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998);
see also State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, *{ 28, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App
170,^113, 72 P.3d 138.
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"[Defendants are best served by presenting unpreserved arguments to this court
through the lens of [plain error or exceptional circumstances]. Without more, the
presentation of the merits of an issue cannot access an exception to the preservation
doctrine." State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, *| 21,

P.3d

. To establish plain error,

a defendant must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v. Casey, 2003
UT55,^|41,82P.3dll06.
1.

Lack of preservation.
In the issues section of her brief, defendant asserts that her rule 609 claim is

preserved, citing to the record at Rl 19:197-98. See Appellant's Br. at 3. In Point III of
the brief, she treats the claim as if it had been preserved. Id. at 30-35.
The claim, however, was not preserved. Defendant did object below to the
prosecutor's cross-examination questions about the elements of forgery, but not on the
grounds she now raises on appeal. Rather, defendant objected below "on two grounds."
Rl 19:197. Her counsel first argued that the testimony sought was irrelevant. Id.
(stating, "[f]irst of all, on relevance"). Counsel then argued that the evidence was
"beyond the scope of [his] direct." Id.
On appeal, however, defendant argues that the cross-examination violated rule
609, Utah Rules of Evidence. See Appellant's Br. at 30. Defendant did not mention or
refer to rule 609 below. See Rl 19:197. She did not argue that cross-examination
violated the rule. See id. Thus, she did not raise her rule 609 claim "to a level of
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consciousness such that the trial [court] c[ould] consider it." Brown, 856 P.2d at 361
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The claim is unpreserved.
2.

Failure to adequately brief the plain error claim.
Defendant's briefing of her claim under the plain error exception to the

preservation rule is inadequate. The Utah Supreme has recently noted the importance of
making a plain error analysis, rather than a mere assertion of plain error. As set forth
above, the court has observed, "[Defendants are best served by presenting unpreserved
arguments to this court through the lens of one or all of these exceptions [e.g., plain error
or exceptional circumstances]. Without more, the presentation of the merits of an issue
cannot access an exception to the preservation doctrine." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^j 21.
Defendant asserts that plain error occurred, but does not set forth the plain error
standard or explain why the court's failure to strike the cross-examination questions met
that standard. In making her argument, she refers only once to plain error, merely
asserting that any error was plain but not explaining why. See Appellant's Br. at 34.
Significantly, she makes no attempt to explain why the alleged error should have been
obvious.
Defendant's bald assertion of plain error is insufficient to inform this Court or the
State of how the plain error exception to the preservation rule applies to her claim. The
claim is inadequately briefed, and this Court should therefore decline to address it.
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B.

In any event, cross-examination of defendant about her forgery did not
violate rule 609, Even if it did, defendant opened the door to the prosecutor's
questions.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor's cross-examination violated rule 609 by

seeking more than the nature, date, and sentence for forgery. Appellant's Br. at 35.
Defendant's claim fails because rule 609 does not proscribe the kinds of questions the
prosecutor asked and because, even if it did, defendant opened the door to those
questions.
Rule 609 provides that "evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the
punishment." Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2). The rule itself does not foreclose inquiry into the
details of the underlying crime, but case law does. "[A] Rule 609(a) inquiry should be
limited to the nature of the crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment. A
prosecutor may not parade the details of the prior crime in front of the jury." State v.
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990).
Here, defendant took the stand and testified, "I pled guilty to a forgery that I
committed and I took responsibility of that." Rl 19:194. She further stated that she "told
Officer Malley that [she] did commit the forgery and that [she] didn't have anything to do
with the drugs that he found in his car." Id. She testified that she "volunteered . . . to
take a drug test," but that Officer Malley did not perform one." Rl 19:194-95.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether forgery is a crime
committed "with the purpose to defraud anyone" committed by making a "writing so that
the writing . . . . purports to be the act of another." Rl 19:197. Defendant answered,
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"Yes." The prosecutor then asked, "So this is a situation that involves someone's
honesty, doesn't it?" Defendant again answered, "Yes." Id.
These questions did not elicit the details of defendant's forgery. The prosecutor
did not ask whose signature she had forged, why she had forged it, the value of any
property obtained through the forgery, etc. He merely clarified through her testimony
that forgery is a crime involving dishonesty, permissible inquiry into the "nature of the
crime." Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822. His questions did not violate rule 609. The purpose of
the rule is to permit impeachment of credibility through evidence of offenses involving
dishonesty. The prosecutor's questions merely clarified that any forgery involves
dishonesty.
In addition, even if the cross-examination did violate rule 609, defendant opened
the door to the prosecutor's questions. "When a defendant on direct examination
attempts to explain away the effect of the conviction or to minimize his guilt, a defendant
may then be cross-examined on any facts which are relevant to the direct examination."
Id. at 823 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A "defendant has no right to
set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a
cross-examination upon those facts." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, defendant attempted in her direct testimony to use her forgery conviction to
show that she was forthright and honest—"I pled guilty to a forgery that I committed and
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I took the responsibility of that." Rl 19:194. In other words, she suggested that because
she pled guilty to forgery she was a person who took responsibility for her crimes and
that she should therefore be believed when she said that she did not commit the drug
offense. Defendant's attempt to use the forgery to show her honesty opened the door to
the prosecutor's questions eliciting her admission that forgery is a crime of dishonesty.
In any case, any error was harmless. "The test for harmless error in cases
involving an erroneous failure to exclude prior convictions is whether, absent the error,
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant." State v.
Cravens, 2000 UT App 344, f 13, 15 P.3d 635 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Here, there is little likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant absent the
prosecutor's elicitation of defendant's concession that forgery is a crime of dishonesty.
The prosecutor was entitled to impeach defendant with evidence of her conviction for
forgery. The common meaning of the term, "forgery" conveys its dishonest or fraudulent

During continuing direct examination, counsel asked defendant, "Can you tell us
during the conversation you had with Officer Malley, what you acknowledged or
admitted that you're taking responsibility for and what you did not acknowledge and take
responsibility for in that conversation?" Rl 19:194. Defendant responded, "I told Officer
Malley that I did commit the forgery and that I didn't have anything to do with the drugs
that he found in his car." Id. "I volunteered myself to take a drug test." Id. Defendant
further testified that Officer Malley did not conduct a drug test. Rl 19:195. Defendant's
testimony suggested that the officer, by not administering the test, was at least negligent
and perhaps intentionally trying to hide some matter relevant to the investigation. In fact,
however, possession does not require ingestion. Defendant was charged for
constructively possessing drugs, i.e., having them in her control, not for having taken
them into her body. See R2.
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nature. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged {doming
forgery as "the crime of falsely and with fraudulent intent making or altering a writing or
other instrument that if genuine might apparently be of legal effect on the rights of
another"). Thus, what jurors learned from defendant's responses to the challenged crossexamination was nothing more than what they would have learned had she merely
testified that she committed a forgery and had the challenged cross-examination not
occurred. Error, if any, was therefore harmless.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR BY NOT SUA
SPONTE STRIKING PORTIONS OF THE PROSECUTOR'S
CLOSING ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that during closing argument "the prosecutor alleged that the
defense counsel was trying to deceive the jury," "stated his personal belief that the
defendant was 'lying,'" "argued that because the defendant had been dishonest in the
past, she must have been lying when she denied possessing drugs," and accused
defendant of passing bad checks. Appellant's Br. at 35, 38. Ordinarily, the appellate
court reviews a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^|10, 69 P.3d 1278. However, where a defendant raises the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct for the first time on appeal, the court reviews her claim for
plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^{14, 128 P.3d
1171.
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A.

Defendant's claim is unpreserved. She has inadequately briefed her plain
error claim.
While defendant alleges that this claim is preserved, she did not object below to

any portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. See Appellant's Br. at 3-4; Rl 19:21221, 240-46. The claim is therefore unpreserved.
In her preservation section, defendant argues that her claim is preserved and, if
not, that the misconduct constituted plain error. See Appellant's Br. at 4. In her
argument section, however, defendant simply argues the claim as if it were preserved.
She never mentions the phrase "plain error." See id. at 35-41. She does not set forth the
plain error standard, nor analyze the issue as a question of plain error. See id. Thus, she
has failed to present her unpreserved argument to this Court through the lens of plain
error. "Without more, [her] presentation of the merits of [this] issue cannot access an
exception to the preservation doctrine." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, *f 21. This Court should
therefore decline to review her claim.
B.

Even assuming that defendant had adequately briefed her plain error claim,
she could not prevail.
Even assuming that defendant had adequately briefed her plain error claim, she

could not prevail on the merits of her claim. A claim of prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument generally "has two components. First, the defendant must demonstrate
that the prosecutor called to the jurors' attention to matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining their verdict. Second, the defendant must show
that the jury was probably influenced by those remarks." State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, \
36, 154 P.3d 788 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The courts "have
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stated, however, that counsel for both sides have considerable latitude in their arguments
to the jury; they may discuss fully their viewpoints of the evidence and the deductions
arising therefrom." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v.
Colwell 2000 UT 8, f 39, 994 P.2d 177 (citations omitted). To obtain a reversal, a
defendant must show that the prosecutor's remarks were "obviously improper and
harmful." See Colwell, 2000 UT 8,139.
1.

The prosecutor did not call to the attention of jurors matters "they would not
be justified in considering" when he challenged the defense suggestion that
defendant should be believed because she had admitted to a forgery.
Defendant claims that "the prosecutor impermissibly accused defense counsel of

misleading the jury" and "voiced his personal opinion that the defendant lied when she
denied drug possession." Appellant's Br. at 36, 39-40 (title case and boldface omitted)
(citing R119:241-42).3
Defendant cites the prosecutor's statement that defense counsel had focused on
defendant's forgery because "[t]he defense would lead you to believe that because
[defendant] admitted to the forgery, what she was saying about the drugs was also
true

Don't be fooled by this. Don't be fooled." Id. at 38 (citing Rl 19:241-42).

Defendant claims that this argument "urg[ed] consideration of defense counsel's
integrity." Id.

Defendant also claims that the prosecutor "urged consideration of inadmissible
character evidence." Appellant's Br. at 40 (title case and boldface omitted). This claim
derives from defendant's claim that evidence of her forgery "was irrelevant bad acts
evidence offered to impugn [her] character." Id. As explained above, the trial court ruled
this evidence admissible. The evidence was presented to the jury, and the prosecutor did
not commit misconduct by referring to it during closing argument.
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The prosecutor did not improperly impugn defense counsel. Defendant suggested
in her direct testimony that she should be considered truthful because she was a person
who took responsibility for the crimes she did commit. She stated, "I pled guilty to a
forgery that I committed and I took the responsibility of that." Rl 19:194. She testified
that she "told Officer Malley that [she] did commit the forgery and that [she] didn't have
anything to do with the drugs that he found in his car." Id. Thus, defendant urged her
credibility on the basis of the statements she made at the time of her arrest.
In his closing, defense counsel referenced this testimony. He stated, "[T]his
officer [Officer Malley] first approached [defendant] because there's a warrant before
you and she took the stand and she has testified, she took responsibility." Rl 19:238.
Counsel continued, "She pled guilty on the forgery. She told the officer from the get-go,
yes, you know you've got me on the forgery. I admit I did that but I did not and I do not
have possession of the drugs that (inaudible). From the get-go she has asserted that
position." Id. By referencing this testimony, defense counsel suggested, as defendant
had done during her testimony, that she was a person who took responsibility for her
crimes and that she should therefore be believed when she stated that she did not possess
the drugs.
Thus, on rebuttal, the prosecutor was entitled to discuss fully his viewpoint of this
evidence and of the inferences it did or did not support. He was entitled to argue that
defendant's testimony should not be believed and that her pleading guilty to the forgery,
a crime involving dishonesty, did not make her believable.
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This argument did not disparage defense counsel. It merely explained another
view of the inferences to be drawn from the facts that defendant had a forgery conviction,
even where it rested on a guilty plea. A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by
arguing his view of the facts. See Powell, 2007 UT 9, \ 36; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, U 39.
Defendant further claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he
characterized as "strange" defendant's suggestion that she was truthful because she took
responsibility for her forgery, noting that forgery itself involves dishonesty. See
Appellant's Br. at 39-40 (citing Rl 19:242). The prosecutor stated: "That to me is very
strange, ladies and gentlemen, because she admits to lying about something, having lied
in the past and then wants you to believe that she's not lying on that day. Don't be fooled
by this." SeeRl 11:242.
As authority for his claim, defendant cites precedent stating that a prosecutor
commits "misconduct when he or she asserts personal knowledge of the facts in issue or
expresses personal opinion, being a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony which tends
to exploit the influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine the objective
detachment that should separate a lawyer from the cause being argued." Appellant's Br.
at 39 (quoting Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1284 (additional citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Here, as in State v. Parsons, the case upon which defendant relies, the prosecutor
did not assert personal knowledge of the facts or express a personal opinion. Rather, the
prosecutor "merely dr[ew] a permissible deduction from the evidence." Parsons, 781
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P.2d at 1284. A prosecutor does not commit misconduct by arguing the inferences that
the evidence supports. See Powell, 2007 UT 9, *{ 36; Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 39.
Finally, nothing suggests that the jury was improperly influenced by the
prosecutors remarks or that, absent theses portions of closing argument, the verdict would
have been different.
2.

The prosecutor's reference to "passing bad checks," while improper, did not
prejudice defendant
As explained, during the rebuttal portion of closing argument, the prosecutor

argued that the defense "want[ed] to divert [the jury's] attention away from the fact that
the defendant has a conviction for lying, for dishonesty, for forgery, passing bad checks."
He continued, "You heard the definition of what a forgery i s . . . . The defense would lead
you to believe that because she admitted to the forgery what she was saying about the
drugs was true. That to me is very strange

" Rl 19:242.

The prosecutor's statement that defendant had a conviction for "passing bad
checks" was likely improper, as it referred to a detail of the crime underlying defendant's
forgery conviction that had not been placed in evidence. Defendant, however, cannot
meet her burden to show that the likely-inadvertent remark constituted plain error. She
cannot show that the error was obvious or prejudicial. First, the remark was brief and
merely referenced a common way that forgery is committed. Thus, it would not have
been obvious to the trial court. Moreover, absent the remark, there is no reasonable
probability that defendant would have received a more favorable result. The issue before
the jury was whether defendant told the truth when she stated to Officer Malley that she
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had no connection with the drugs found under the seat of the police car and when she
later testified at trial that she had no connection. Knowing that defendant had committed
the forgery by passing a bad check, rather than merely knowing that defendant had
committed the forgery, would not likely have made a difference in the jury's assessment
of that issue. In general, a single isolated sentence in an otherwise well-tried case will
not rise to the level of misconduct justifying a new trial. See United States v. Socony
Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 239 (1940).
IV.
ANY ERRORS IN THIS CASE WERE SO MINOR AS TO RESULT
IN NO HARM
Defendant claims that "when considered cumulatively, the errors [in this case]
undermine confidence that defendant received a fair trial." Appellant's Br. at 41-42.
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court] will reverse only if 'the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] confidence . . . that a fair trial was
had.'" State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, \ 74, 125 P.3d 878 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). If "the errors are found to be so minor as to result in no harm,
the doctrine will not be applied." Id. (citation omitted). Any errors in this case were
sufficiently minor that they resulted in no harm. Thus, defendant cannot prevail under
the cumulative error doctrine.
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
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Addendum

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The text of this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word "statute" the words
"Constitution of the United States" have been added.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one
of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also
Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more
appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise
use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah
cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and
admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial,
or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Advisory Committee Note B Rule 404 is now Federal Rule of Evidence 404 verbatim. The 2001 amendments add the
notice provisions already in the federal rule, add the amendments made to the federal rule effective December 1, 2000,
and delete language added to the Utah Rule 404(b) in 1998. However, the deletion of that language is not intended to
reinstate the holding of State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b)
must also conform with Rules 402 and 403 to be admissible.

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule
403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction,
whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However,
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to
the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a
fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule
if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a
subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has
been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court discretion in convictions not
involving dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant.
Current Utah law mandates the admission of such evidence. State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973);
State v. Van Dam, 554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).
There is presently no provision in Utah law similar to Subsection (d).
The pendency of an appeal does not render a conviction inadmissible. This is in accord with Utah case law. State v.
Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717 (1922).
This rule is identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 1990 amendments to the federal rule made two
changes in the rule. The comment to the federal rule accurately reflects the Committee's view of the purpose of the
amendments.

